Ledbetter Equal Pay Act Passes Congress

In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (2007) 550 U.S. 618,  Congress passed Senate Bill 181 (the “Lilly Ledbetter Fairy Pay Act of 2009”). There have been a number of attempts to legislatively alter the Ledbetter decision, which held that the statute of limitations for filing a Title VII charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC begins when the discrete discriminatory act occurs.

In Ledbetter’s case, she claimed she was paid a lower salary than her male counter-parts.  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. avoided liability by establishing the fact that Ledbetter’s salary had been lower than her male counter-parts for years.  Since discrimination claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the discrimination (or 300 days in some states), the court held that Ms. Ledbetter failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies despite the fact that the consequences of discriminatory pay practice continued.  In essence, the court felt that the discriminatory act occured when Ms. Ledbetter initially received the lower pay and the fact that the lower pay led to lower raises over the next several years creating an even greater disparity was insufficient to start a new violation.  Employee advocates dissatisfied with the decision immediately began petitioning the legislature to amend Title VII.

Senate Bill 181 amends Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, to clarify that a unlawful discriminatory compensation decisions occur each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision.  The bill willmake it unlawful each time an employer writes a paycheck that gives some workers less than others, because of race, sex, disability, religion or national origin.  The bill still needs to be approved by President Obama.  Once signed into law, it will apply to bias claims that filed on or after May 28, 2007.

Sayar Fausto, LLP

350 Second St. Suite 5
Los Altos, CA 94022
Tel: (650) 948-6114
Fax: (650) 947-0770

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and SAYAR FAUSTO LLP. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and SAYAR FAUSTO LLP cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

Statutory Immunity No Bar to Liability for Public Entity

When 69-year-old Theodore DeJung was rejected for a full-time commissioner position for the Sonoma County Superior Court in favor of a person 26 years his junior, Mr. DeJung sued the court for age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act.  The Superior Court moved for summary judgment contending that the superior court enjoyed discretionary immunity against suits for employment discrimination under the FEHA when selecting candidates for commissioner positions.  The trial court agreed.

The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court’s decision finding that governmental discretionary immunity does not apply to employment discrimination actions under FEHA against public entities as employers.

The Tort Claims Act sets forth specific public employee immunities.  Government Code Section 820.2, sometimes referred to as the “discretionary act immunity,” states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

Government Code Section 815.2(b) states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”

The question was whether the discretionary act immunity for public employees, when read together with Section 815.2(b), provided the superior court “as an entity” with immunity from FEHA claims based on the discretionary acts of its judiciary in selecting appointees for commissioner positions.

Because the FEHA defines the term “employer” as including “the state or any political or civil subdivision of the state, and cities ….” the court believed the Legislature intended to subject public entities to liability for violations of FEHA.  Therefore, it was a “clear indication of legislative intent that Section 820.2 and Section 815.2(b) immunity be withdrawn.”

Sayar Fausto, LLP

350 Second St. Suite 5
Los Altos, CA 94022
Tel: (650) 948-6114
Fax: (650) 947-0770

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and SAYAR FAUSTO LLP. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and SAYAR FAUSTO LLP cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.